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Reciprocal Immunity
COLIN MILLER*

A defendant is charged with using extortionate means to collect a loan. Two
brothers give statements to the FBI. One brother’s statement tends to incriminate the
defendant. The other brother’s statement tends to exonerate the defendant. Both
brothers indicate that they will invoke the privilege against self-incrimination if
called to testify at trial. The prosecutor gives immunity to the brother whose
statement incriminates but doesn’t give immunity to the brother whose statement
exonerates. The jury only hears from the first brother and returns a guilty verdict.
These are the truncated facts of United States v. Davis, a recent Seventh Circuit
opinion that has led to a cert. petition to the Supreme Court. The same result,
however, could have occurred in nearly any court, with cases across the country
standing for the proposition that a grant of immunity to a witness for the prosecution
doesn’t require reciprocal immunity for a directly contradictory defense witness.
This essay advances a reciprocal rights theory. It argues that the Constitution
precludes statutes and rules from providing nonreciprocal benefits to the State when
the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial,
unless reciprocity would implicate a significant state interest. Therefore, unless a
significant State interest is involved, a grant of immunity to a prosecution witness
should trigger reciprocal immunity to a directly contradictory defense witness.
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INTRODUCTION
A defendant is charged with using extortionate means to collect a loan. Two
brothers give statements to the FBI. One brother’s statement tends to incriminate the
defendant. The other brother’s statement tends to exonerate the defendant. Both
brothers indicate that they will invoke the privilege against self-incrimination if
called to testify at trial. The prosecutor gives immunity to the brother whose
statement incriminates but doesn’t give immunity to the brother whose statement
exonerates. The jury only hears from the first brother and returns a guilty verdict.
These are the truncated facts of United States v. Davis,1 a recent Seventh Circuit
opinion that has led to a cert. petition to the Supreme Court. The same result,
however, could have occurred in nearly any court, with cases across the country
standing for the proposition that a grant of immunity to a witness for the prosecution
doesn’t require reciprocal immunity for a directly contradictory defense witness.
This essay advances a reciprocal rights theory. It argues that the Constitution
precludes statutes and rules from providing nonreciprocal benefits to the State when
the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial,
unless reciprocity would implicate a significant state interest. Therefore, unless a
significant State interest is involved, a grant of immunity to a prosecution witness
should trigger reciprocal immunity to a directly contradictory defense witness.
I. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
To understand the argument for reciprocal immunity, we must begin by
considering the privilege against self-incrimination. In relevant part, the Fifth
Amendment states that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.”2 In Hoffman v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that there are two circumstances in which a witness can plead the Fifth: (1) where an
answer to a question, such as “Did you rob the bank,” would directly support a
conviction; and (2) where an answer to a question, such as, “Where is the money that
was taken from the bank,” could furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute the claimant.3
In Ohio v. Reiner, the Court later held that a witness can only plead the Fifth based
on reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer to a question and noted
that dangers of “imaginary and unsubstantial character” won’t suffice. 4 That said, the
Court also held in Reiner that a witness can plead the Fifth even though she maintains
her innocence.5 Therefore, in Reiner, even though the prosecution claimed that a twomonth old child was the victim of “shaken baby syndrome” based upon his father’s
actions, the child’s babysitter qualified for Fifth Amendment protection. 6

1. 845 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 65 (2017).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
4. 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (per curiam) (quoting Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362,
366 (1917)).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 18.
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II. IMMUNITY
When a witness states an intention to plead the Fifth, the prosecutor can offer her
immunity to try to secure her testimony. There are two types of immunity. The
Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 and subsequent statutes only permitted
prosecutors to offer transactional immunity. 7 Transactional immunity means that the
witness can never be prosecuted for the crime/transaction that is the subject of her
testimony.8 If Co-Defendant accepts transactional immunity to testify against
Defendant at a bank robbery trial, the State cannot thereafter prosecute Co-Defendant
for that bank robbery or any crimes related to that robbery. For example, the
prosecutor eventually gave the babysitter in Reiner transactional immunity, meaning
she couldn’t be prosecuted for any crime in connection with the child’s death. 9
The second type of immunity is use and derivative use immunity. 10 This type of
immunity can be explained by re-examining the bank robbery hypothetical. Under
use immunity, if the State were to prosecute Co-Defendant for bank robbery, it could
not introduce/use a transcript of Co-Defendant’s immunized testimony from
Defendant’s trial. Furthermore, under derivative use immunity, the State couldn’t use
Co-Defendant’s immunized testimony to obtain/derive additional evidence to use
against Co-Defendant at her subsequent bank robbery trial. For instance, assume that
Co-Defendant testified at Defendant’s trial that they committed the crime with
Accomplice and buried the money behind Accomplice’s house, followed by police
interviewing Accomplice and digging up the money. Based upon derivative use
immunity, the State couldn’t introduce Accomplice’s testimony or the recovered
money at Co-Defendant’s trial because they were the product of Co-Defendant’s
immunized testimony.
Conversely, the State could prosecute Co-Defendant based upon evidence
obtained from an “independent source” unconnected to the immunized testimony. 11
Imagine that, after Defendant’s trial, Eyewitness tells a police officer, “I’ve kept
quiet until now because Co-Defendant threatened me, but Co-Defendant confessed
to me that she robbed the bank with Defendant.” If Co-Defendant testified at
Defendant’s trial pursuant to a grant of use and derivative use immunity, the State
could still prosecute Co-Defendant for bank robbery and use testimony by
Eyewitness, an independent source.
In Kastigar v. United States, the Supreme Court found that an offer of use and
derivative use immunity is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of Fifth
Amendment privilege.12 Around the time of Kastigar, Congress repealed its
transactional immunity statute and replaced it with a use and derivative use statute
contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 to 6005.13 Courts across the country have consistently
held that the decision of whether to grant immunity is solely within the discretion of

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See State v. Kenny, 342 A.2d 189, 193 (N.J. 1975).
See, e.g., State v. Belanger, 210 P.3d 783, 787 (N.M. 2009).
Reiner, 532 U.S. at 18.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972).
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6005 (2012).
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the prosecutor and that neither a judge nor defense counsel can force a prosecutor to
grant immunity to a defense witness. 14
III. RECIPROCAL IMMUNITY
With prosecutors having sole discretion over grants of immunity, situations like
the one in the introduction recur, with the prosecutor granting immunity to a witness
whose testimony will incriminate the defendant and refusing to grant immunity to a
directly contradictory witness whose testimony would exonerate the defendant. In
such situations, courts have categorically concluded that judges lack authority under
the federal immunity statute and state counterparts to (1) compel prosecutors to grant
reciprocal immunity; or (2) grant reciprocal immunity themselves. 15
That said, these courts also have noted that a prosecutor’s decision to grant
immunity is constrained by the Due Process Clause, meaning that conduct
contravening the Clause could require reciprocal immunity or other relief. 16
According to almost every court, a prosecutor violates the Due Process Clause by
granting immunity to a government witness and not granting immunity to a directly
contradictory defense witness in only one scenario: when the prosecutor intentionally
attempts to distort the fact-finding process.17 Courts have identified two types of
intentional distortion. First, the prosecutor could grant immunity to a government
witness and refuse to grant immunity to a defense witness whom the prosecutor had
intimidated or harassed to discourage her testimony. 18 Second, the prosecutor could
refuse to give immunity to a defense witness with the goal of precluding the jury
from hearing exculpatory testimony. 19 It appears, however, that no court has ever
found such prosecutorial misconduct. In its 2009 opinion in State v. Belanger, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico located no cases in which a prosecutor was forced to
grant reciprocal immunity to a defense witness. 20
When a defendant claims that the failure to grant reciprocal immunity to a directly
contradictory defense witness was an attempt at intentional distortion, there are
typically three results, all of which result in no relief. First, prosecutors in some cases
claim that granting immunity might interfere with future prosecution of defense
witnesses, which the First Circuit found is “a major reason why judges have not
shared the enthusiasm of student law review editors for creating a ‘right’ of
defendants to insist on immunity for defense witnesses.”21 Second, prosecutors in
other cases assert that they think prospective defense witnesses are lying and that
they don’t want to facilitate perjury by immunizing their testimony. This was the sole
claim made by the prosecutor in the Davis case from the introduction. Third,
prosecutors in many cases never have to defend their refusal to grant reciprocal

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See, e.g., United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 (3rd Cir. 1978).
See, e.g., United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1190 (1st Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1191.
Id.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
210 P.3d 783, 797 (N.M. 2009).
United States v. Mackey, 117 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1997).
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immunity.22 This is because several jurisdictions require defendants to make
“substantial evidentiary showing[s]” of intent to distort the fact-finding process
before requiring prosecutors to explain why they refused to grant reciprocal
immunity.23 Given that very few defendants are able to make such a showing,
prosecutors rarely have to explain their reasoning.
Until recently, defendants in one federal judicial circuit might have had an easier
time in forcing prosecutors to grant reciprocal immunity. In its 1980 opinion in
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, the Third Circuit suggested that a
defendant could compel a prosecutor to grant reciprocal immunity to a defense
witness if she could satisfy five requirements: “immunity must be properly sought in
the district court; the defense witness must be available to testify; the proffered
testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there
must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of
immunity.”24
In its 2013 opinion in United States v. Quinn, however, the Third Circuit
abrogated Smith, concluding that courts can never force prosecutors to grant
immunity because the power to grant immunity rests solely with the executive
branch.25 That said, the court concluded that a defendant who can establish the five
Smith factors still establishes a due process violation. But, according to the court, the
remedy for such a violation is dismissal of charges rather than reciprocal immunity. 26
Some courts applying the “intentional distortion” test have similarly found that
courts lack the authority to force prosecutors to grant reciprocal immunity. 27
IV. RECIPROCAL RIGHTS
This essay posits that there are two types of rights in criminal cases: unilateral
rights and reciprocal rights. Certain criminal rights are unilateral, with the
prosecution having an obligation to the defense and the defense having no reciprocal
obligation to the prosecution. For instance, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, the
prosecution has a due process duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the
defense while the defense has no reciprocal duty to disclose material inculpatory
evidence to the prosecution.28 Given that this Brady right is unilateral, the defense
has to prove prosecutorial misconduct; for example, the failure to turn over certain
evidence.29
As the foregoing material makes clear, courts have looked at defense witness
immunity from a unilateral rights perspective and concluded that defendants are not
entitled to relief based on failure to immunize defense witness testimony unless they
can establish prosecutorial misconduct. This essay contends, however, that courts
should consider defense witness immunity under a reciprocal rights analysis.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
E.g., United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
615 F.2d 964, 972 (3rd Cir. 1980).
728 F.3d 243, 254 (3rd Cir. 2013).
Id. at 261.
See, e.g., United States v. Allebban, 578 F. App’x 492, 505 (6th Cir. 2014).
See, e.g., Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 116 n.11 (D.C. 1979).
See, e.g., Ferrara v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 2d 384, 432 (D. Mass. 2005).
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Specifically, there are at least three situations in which the Supreme Court or
Congress has concluded that application of a statute or rule conferring a benefit on
the State requires a reciprocal benefit to the defendant, unless a significant state
interest is implicated. The following three subsections explore these three situations
that support a reciprocal rights theory.
A. Reciprocal Discovery
In Williams v. Florida, Johnny Williams declared his intent to claim an alibi
defense at his robbery trial and challenged the constitutionality of Florida’s alibi
notice statute.30 Under the statute, a prosecutor could make a written demand for the
defendant to provide pre-trial notice of the place he claimed to be at the time of the
crime and the names and addresses of alibi witnesses. 31 In its 1970 opinion, the
Supreme Court rejected Williams’s claim that this statute violated his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, concluding that the statute merely
accelerated the timing of a disclosure he was going to make at trial.32 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court noted that Florida’s alibi notice statute was “carefully hedged
with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure to the defendant.” 33
Three years later, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Wardius v. Oregon, in
which Ronald Dale Wardius had been convicted of the sale of narcotics.34 Wardius
failed to comply with Oregon’s alibi notice statute but still called an alibi witness,
who testified that she was with Wardius at a drive-in movie at the time of the crime.35
Thereafter, the judge granted the prosecutor’s motion to strike this testimony based
upon the defense’s failure to comply with the alibi notice statute. 36
After he was convicted, Wardius appealed, claiming that Oregon’s alibi notice
statute was unconstitutional because it did not provide for reciprocal discovery.37 The
Supreme Court agreed, concluding that, unlike the statute in Florida, Oregon’s alibi
notice statute had no reciprocal provision requiring the prosecution to disclose to the
defense: the names and addresses of witnesses it planned to use to refute the
defendant’s alibi defense.38 The Court noted that “the Due Process Clause has little
to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded,” but
found that “it does speak to the balance of forces between the accused and his
accuser.”39 Accordingly, the Court concluded that “the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal
discovery rights are given to criminal defendants.” 40 In reaching this conclusion, the

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

399 U.S. 78, 79 (1970).
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 81.
412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973).
Id. at 472–73.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 472.
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Court implied that the State could possibly avoid reciprocal discovery by pointing to
a significant state interest but observed that Oregon had not cited any such interest. 41
Courts across the country have since applied Wardius to require reciprocal
discovery in cases ranging from expert witness disclosures42 to character witness
disclosures.43
B. Right To Present a Defense
As support for its conclusion, the Supreme Court in Wardius cited its prior opinion
in Washington v. Texas to claim that it had been especially suspicious of trial rules
providing “nonreciprocal benefits to the State when the lack of reciprocity interferes
with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial.” 44 In Washington v. Texas, the State
prosecuted Jackie Washington for the murder of his ex-girlfriend’s new boyfriend.45
At trial, Washington testified that his friend, Charles Fuller, took his shotgun and
fatally shot the new boyfriend after Washington tried to persuade him to leave. 46 To
support this claim, Washington tried to call Fuller, who would have testified that
Washington “pulled at him and tried to persuade him to leave . . . before Fuller fired
the fatal shot.”47 Fuller, however, was charged as an accomplice in the murder, and
a Texas statute precluded persons charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories
in the same crime from testifying on behalf of their co-defendants.48
After he was convicted, Washington appealed, claiming that the statute was
unconstitutional.49 The Supreme Court agreed, largely focusing on the fact that the
statute allowed the State to call an alleged accomplice as a witness for the prosecution
to incriminate a defendant while not allowing the accused to call an alleged
accomplice to exonerate the defendant.50 While the State claimed that this dichotomy
was justified based on the greater likelihood that an accomplice would lie in a way
that helps a defendant, the Court concluded that an accused was actually likelier to
lie in a way that helps the State in an effort to “obtain favors from the prosecution.”51
Having rejected the State’s proposed dichotomy, the Court used the Sixth
Amendment Compulsory Process Clause to conclude that:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense,

41. Id. at 476.
42. See Grey v. State, 178 P.3d 154, 159–61 (Nev. 2008).
43. See State v. Pond, 193 P.3d 368, 380–82 (Haw. 2008).
44. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474 n.6 (citing 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967)). The Court also cited its
landmark opinion of Gideon v. Wainwright.
45. 388 U.S. 14, 15 (1967).
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id. at 22–23.
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the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the
prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. 52
The Supreme Court has since held that the State violates the right to present a defense
by preventing a defendant from presenting witnesses and/or evidence unless the
State’s action serves legitimate interests in the criminal trial process in a manner that
is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. 53
Lower courts have frequently applied the right to present a defense under a
reciprocal rights analysis. For instance, in State v. Watt, at a DUI trial, the State
introduced a video of the defendant’s arrest which included audio of the defendant
speaking.54 While the defendant chose not to testify, he sought to introduce a voice
exemplar without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination.55 The defendant
claimed that admission of this evidence would allow the jury to compare his voice in
the exemplar to his voice in the video and determine whether he sounded intoxicated
in the video.56
The trial court concluded that the defendant couldn’t introduce the exemplar
without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination.57 On appeal, the defendant
noted that the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that prosecutors can introduce
voice exemplars as demonstrative evidence against nontestifying defendants without
violating the privilege against self-incrimination.58 Therefore, he “argue[d] that the
due process principle of reciprocity requires that criminal defendants likewise be
granted the right to seek admission of voice exemplars without being deemed to have
waived their right to be free from self-incrimination.”59 The Missouri Court of
Appeals agreed and noted that several other courts had reached similar conclusions. 60
C. Statements Against Interest
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement other than one
made by a declarant while testifying at trial offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.61 In turn, Rule 802 provides that hearsay is generally inadmissible unless
there is an applicable exclusion or exception. 62 Rule 804(b)(3) contains one such
exception. If a declarant is “unavailable,” Rule 804(b)(3) allows a party to introduce
the declarant’s statements against interest, such as statements exposing the declarant
to criminal liability.63

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 18–19.
See, e.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 319–20 (2006).
531 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 544–45.
See id. at 546.
Id.
See id. at 546–47.
FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
FED. R. EVID. 802.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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Prior to 2010, Rule 804(b)(3) provided that “[a] statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.”64 Under this pre-2010 version, assume that a Defendant was charged with
bank robbery and Alternate Suspect confessed to committing the crime by herself. If
Alternate Suspect pled the Fifth at Defendant’s trial, the defense would not be able
to introduce Alternate Suspect’s statement unless there were sufficient corroborating
circumstances, such as Eyewitness placing Alternate Suspect at the crime scene.
Conversely, assume that Accomplice confessed to taking part in the bank robbery,
with the prosecution having the theory that Accomplice and Defendant committed
the crime together. Under this pre-2010 version, the prosecution would not need to
establish corroborating circumstances to admit Accomplice’s statement if she pled
the Fifth or were otherwise unavailable.
Several courts noted this lack of reciprocity, including the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Alvarez, in which the defendant “was convicted of heroin trafficking charges
by the words of a dead man.” 65 Specifically, the defendant’s alleged co-conspirator
made a statement incriminating himself and the defendant but died in a car accident
before the defendant’s trial. 66 The prosecution thereafter introduced the decedent’s
statement at trial, with the Fifth Circuit later noting that there were not corroborating
circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement. 67
The court acknowledged that Rule 804(b)(3) only required corroborating
circumstances for statements offered to exculpate the accused, but it found that this
disparate treatment violated the Confrontation Clause. 68 Therefore, the court created
“a unitary standard” under Rule 804(b)(3), concluding that that the Confrontation
Clause requires the prosecution to prove the same corroborating circumstances that
the defense must prove to admit a statement exposing a declarant to criminal
liability.69 According to the Supreme Court, this unitary standard actually advanced
and did not impede the State’s interest in “the accuracy of the truth-determining
process.”70
Later, in 2010, Congress amended Rule 804(b)(3) based on cases “interpret[ing]
Rule 804(b)(3) in this reciprocal manner” 71 to create a “unitary approach to
declarations against penal interest.”72 Under the new Rule, a statement against
interest must be “supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the
declarant to criminal liability.”73

64. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (1997) (amended 2010).
65. 584 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1978).
66. See id. at 695–96.
67. Id. at 701.
68. See id. at 700.
69. See id. at 701.
70. See id. at 700–01 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
71. United States v. Bonds, No. C 07–00732 SI, 2011 WL 511387, at *6 n.6 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 15, 2011).
72. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendments.
73. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B).
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V. RECIPROCAL IMMUNITY UNDER A RECIPROCAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS
Each of these decisions by the Supreme Court and Congress supports a reciprocal
rights theory. Under this theory, the Constitution precludes statutes and rules from
providing nonreciprocal benefits to the State when the lack of reciprocity interferes
with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial, unless reciprocity would implicate
a significant state interest. The following three subsections explore how the three
parts of this theory support the requirement of reciprocal immunity.
A. Nonreciprocal Benefits
Each of the decisions from the prior section involved nonreciprocal benefits. In
Wardius, the defendant had to provide the prosecution with notice of alibi witnesses
while the prosecution did not have to provide the defense with notice of alibi rebuttal
witnesses. In Washington, prosecutors could call accomplices as State’s witnesses
while defendants couldn’t call accomplices as defense witnesses. And the pre-2010
version of Rule 804(b)(3) allowed prosecutors to object to uncorroborated statements
against penal interest while defendants couldn’t object to such statements on
corroboration grounds.
The federal immunity statute and state counterparts are similarly nonreciprocal.
A prosecutor can immunize an inculpatory witness to testify for the State while the
defense can’t immunize an exculpatory witness for the defense. Moreover, neither
the defense nor the court can force a prosecutor to provide such reciprocal immunity
to a directly contradictory defense witness. Courts generally have assessed
arguments for reciprocal immunity under a unilateral rights theory and found that
reciprocity is not required unless there is prosecutorial misconduct. Conversely,
under a reciprocal rights theory, the lack of reciprocity alone should be sufficient to
trigger constitutional scrutiny.
B. Interference with the Defendant’s Ability To Secure a Fair Trial
Each of the decisions from the prior section also supports the proposition that the
Constitution governs the “balance of forces between the accused and his accuser.”74
The Court in Wardius explicitly reached this conclusion, finding that the Due Process
Clause has little to say about the amount of discovery provided but is concerned with
this balance of forces, which is why it required reciprocal discovery. Similarly, the
Supreme Court has held that the Compulsory Process Clause has little to say about
witness competency rules,75 but the Court in Washington concluded that the Clause
required Texas to declare accomplices competent to testify for defendants because
they were competent to testify for the State. These opinions belie the conclusion by
the Third Circuit and some other courts that reciprocal immunity is precluded under
the separation of powers doctrine. Under Wardius, if the lack of reciprocal immunity
“interferes with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial,” courts can use the
Constitution to level the playing field.

74. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
75. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988).
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It appears clear that the lack of reciprocal immunity interferes with the
defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial to the same degree as two of the laws from
the prior section. Under the Texas statute in Washington, assume that Defendant is
charged with bank robbery. Accomplice One agrees to testify as a State’s witness,
and Accomplice Two agrees to testify as a defense witness. Under the statute, only
Accomplice One would be allowed to testify. The Washington Court deemed this
statute unconstitutional, concluding that the right to present a defense is “the right to
present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so
it may decide where the truth lies.”76
The absence of reciprocal immunity can easily produce a similar result.
Accomplice One might give a statement incriminating the defendant while
Accomplice Two gives a statement exonerating the defendant. If both accomplices
state an intention to plead the Fifth, a nonreciprocal grant of immunity to Accomplice
One means that the jury will only hear the prosecution’s version of facts, interfering
with the defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial.
A similar result also could have occurred under the pre-2010 version of Rule
804(b)(3). Assume in the above hypothetical that (1) Accomplice One’s statement
incriminates both Accomplice One and Defendant (e.g., “Defendant and I robbed the
bank”); (2) Accomplice Two’s statement incriminates Accomplice Two but
exonerates Defendant (e.g., “I robbed the bank, and Defendant wasn’t involved.”);
(3) both accomplices state an intention to plead the Fifth; and (4) neither accomplice
is given immunity. If there weren’t corroborating circumstances clearly indicating
the trustworthiness of either statement, the prosecution could introduce Accomplice
One’s statement, but the defense couldn’t introduce Accomplice Two’s statement.
Therefore, like the Washington statute, the pre-2010 version of Rule 804(b)(3)
created situations that are analogous to cases where jurors hear from an immunized
prosecution witness and don’t hear from an unimmunized defense witness.
C. Significant State Interest
Courts in each of the contexts from the prior section considered whether there was
a significant state interest that would justify nonreciprocity. In Wardius, the Court
found no such interest. In Washington, the Court rejected the State’s concern that an
accomplice was likelier to lie for the defense than she was to lie for the prosecution.
And the Fifth Circuit in Alvarez found that nonreciprocity under Rule 804(b)(3)
actually cut against the State’s interest in the accuracy of the truth-determining
process.
Therefore, given that nonreciprocal immunity equally interferes with a
defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial, it would seem that the government should
have to proffer a significant state interest to avoid having to grant reciprocal
immunity. As noted, there are currently three main outcomes when a defendant
claims a Due Process Clause violation based upon a prosecutor’s refusal to grant
reciprocal immunity.

76. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
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1. Substantial Evidentiary Showings
First, some jurisdictions require defendants to make “substantial evidentiary
showings” of intent to distort the fact-finding process, resulting in prosecutors rarely
if ever having to explain why they failed to grant reciprocal immunity. Under this
essay’s reciprocal rights theory, defendants would not have to establish prosecutorial
intent to distort, and the State would always have to proffer a significant state interest
supporting nonreciprocity.
2. Prosecutorial Disbelief of Defense Witnesses
Second, some prosecutors have defended nonreciprocity based solely upon the
belief that prospective defense witnesses are lying and the desire to avoid facilitating
perjury. The State advanced a similar rationale in Washington when it claimed that
there was a greater likelihood that an accomplice would lie on behalf of the defense
as opposed to the prosecution. The Washington Court, however, rejected this
analysis, concluding that an accused was actually likelier to lie on behalf of the State
in an effort to “obtain favors from the prosecution.” 77
A similar analysis applies in the reciprocal immunity context. Assume that (1)
Witness One tells the police that she saw Defendant shoot Victim; (2) Witness Two
tells the police that she saw someone else shoot Victim; and (3) both witnesses have
reasonable cause to apprehend danger if cross-examined regarding their statements
(e.g., because both had a motive to harm Victim and have placed themselves at the
crime scene). In this case, Witness One seems analogous to an accomplice
incriminating a defendant under the Washington statute while Witness Two seems
analogous to an accomplice exonerating a defendant under the same statute.
It is important to note, though, that the Washington Court was assessing
accomplice veracity in a general sense while prosecutors in reciprocal immunity
cases are determining the credibility of particular defense witnesses. Therefore, it’s
easy to imagine a prosecutor in a specific case arguing that she doesn’t want to
immunize a defense witness who, say, has prior convictions or a version of events
that is contradicted by extrinsic evidence.
The question then becomes whether a prosecutor’s concern over defense witness
veracity should overcome a defendant’s interest in the jury hearing her version of
events in a given case. This essay doesn’t propose a comprehensive solution, but it
does offer three considerations. First, a prosecutor’s concern over facilitating perjury
should be somewhat mitigated by the fact that most immunity agreements contain
clauses allowing for future prosecutions for perjury arising out of the immunized
testimony.78 Second, if a prosecutor’s skepticism of a defense witness’s testimony is
based upon contradictory extrinsic evidence, the prosecutor can use that evidence to
impeach the witness and perhaps leave the defendant in a worse position than if the
defense witness hadn’t been given reciprocal immunity. Third, courts shouldn’t view
prosecutorial concerns about defense witness credibility in a vacuum. In many cases,
the defense will have significant evidence to impeach an immunized prosecution

77. Id. at 22–23.
78. JaneAnne Murray, Proffer at Your Peril, 19 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 2, 2 (2005).
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witness. Therefore, if a judge is deciding whether there should be reciprocal
immunity, she should consider the relative credibility of the immunized State’s
witness and the directly contradictory defense witness.
3. Future Prosecution
A third reason sometimes given by prosecutors to avoid reciprocal immunity is
that granting it might interfere with future prosecution of defense witnesses. This
seems like it could be a concern that would constitute a significant state interest
implicated by reciprocal immunity. For example, imagine a scenario in which (1)
Defense Witness and Defendant were involved in a bank robbery; (2) State’s Witness
gives a statement incriminating Defendant; (3) Defense Witness gives a statement
exonerating Defendant; (4) Prosecutor gives State’s Witness immunity; (5)
Prosecutor is forced to give Defense Witness reciprocal immunity; (6) Defense
Witness’s false testimony helps the jury find Defendant “not guilty;”; and (7)
Prosecutor can’t subsequently prosecute Defense Witness for bank robbery due to
immunity. In this case, reciprocal immunity prevents Prosecutor from securing
convictions against two guilty parties.
This essay doesn’t propose a comprehensive solution to such situations, but it
again offers three considerations. First, courts will rarely have to assess whether there
should be reciprocal immunity for a defense witness who has given a statement
exposing herself to criminal liability. Assume that Alternate Suspect confesses to the
murder that has led to charges against Defendant. If Alternate Suspect states an
intention to plead the Fifth at Defendant’s murder trial, there likely wouldn’t be a
need for immunity; assuming that Alternate Suspect’s confession is sufficiently
corroborated, it would be admissible as a statement against interest under Rule
804(b)(3).
Instead, the typical reciprocal immunity case will involve a defense witness who
has given a statement that doesn’t incriminate herself but does create a reasonable
cause for apprehending danger if she were questioned about it a trial. An example of
such a statement could be Eyewitness testifying that she saw someone other than
Defendant murder Victim. Such a statement does not directly incriminate
Eyewitness, but it does place her at the crime scene and could create danger on crossexamination, especially if Eyewitness had a motive to harm Victim. Now, the
prosecutor in this case might have other evidence tying Eyewitness to Victim’s
murder, but the point is that the case for future prosecution based on such a statement
is substantially weaker than if Victim had confessed to involvement in the crime.
This ties into the second consideration: If a prosecutor has evidence tying a
defense witness to the crime, she should be able to impeach the witness’s immunized
testimony. Assume in the prior hypothetical that Prosecutor has evidence such as a
witness who saw Eyewitness hand Defendant a gun and another witness who saw
Eyewitness and Defendant drive off together after the murder. Prosecutor could use
this evidence to impeach Eyewitness and possibly place Defendant in a worse
position than if Eyewitness hadn’t been given reciprocal immunity. In other cases,
the prosecutor might not have (much) evidence tying a defense witness to the crime,
which would reduce the opportunity for impeachment but also greatly reduce the
odds that there would be a future prosecution of the witness.
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A third consideration is that the dominant form of immunity is use and derivative
use immunity, and this essay posits that this should be the only type of reciprocal
immunity. This ties into the prior consideration. If a prosecutor has evidence tying a
defense witness to the crime, a reciprocal grant of use and derivative use immunity
probably won’t put the prosecutor in a worse position with regard to future
prosecution of the witness. In the prior hypothetical, the witnesses saying that
Eyewitness handed Defendant a gun and drove off with her after the murder would
be independent sources who could testify at Eyewitness’s future trial, regardless of
the grant of use and derivative immunity.
The only development that could hinder a future prosecution of an immunized
witness would be an unexpected development during direct or cross-examination.
For example, in the prior hypothetical, Prosecutor would expect Eyewitness to testify
(1) on direct examination that someone other than Defendant killed Victim; and (2)
on cross-examination that she did not hand Defendant a gun or drive away with her.
Neither of these answers would hinder the future prosecution of Eyewitness, nor
would an admission by Eyewitness that she handed Defendant a gun or drove away
with her after the murder. Prosecutor couldn’t use any of this testimony at
Eyewitness’s subsequent trial, but this testimony didn’t exist before trial and didn’t
give the State any new leads to pursue. Therefore, in addition to the testimony of the
two witnesses incriminating Eyewitness, Prosecutor could also use any new evidence
derived from a continuing independent investigation of the crime.
Conversely, assume, for instance, that Eyewitness admitted on cross-examination
not only that she drove away with Defendant after the murder but also surprisingly
said that they drove away in Friend’s car. Previously, an independent investigation
might have led to admissible evidence connected to Friend and/or her car, but now
such evidence couldn’t be used against Eyewitness based upon derivative use
immunity. The question in any given case should be whether this type of risk
constitutes a significant enough state interest to overcome a defendant’s interest in
having a witness give testimony that directly contradicts a State’s witness.
CONCLUSION
Courts have rejected reciprocal immunity based upon a unilateral rights analysis
that requires a defendant to prove that the prosecutor intentionally attempted to
distort the fact-finding process. This essay argues against this conclusion by
proffering a reciprocal rights theory. Under this theory, the Constitution precludes
statutes and rules from providing nonreciprocal benefits to the State when the lack
of reciprocity interferes with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial, unless
reciprocity would implicate a significant state interest. Therefore, unless a significant
State interest is involved, a grant of immunity to a prosecution witness should trigger
reciprocal immunity to a directly contradictory defense witness.

